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Abstract
Citizen participation in the news-making process has been a hopeful promise since the 1990s. Observers hoped for a rejuve-
nation of journalism and democracy alike. However, many of the enthusiastic theoretical concepts on user engagement did
not endure close empirical examination. Some of themajor fallacies of these early works (to whom the author contributed
himself) will be outlined in this article. As a bleak flip side to these utopian ideas, the concept of “dark participation” is in-
troduced here. As research has revealed, this type of user engagement seems to be growing parallel to the recent wave of
populism in Western democracies. In a systematization, some essential aspects of dark participation will be differentiated.
Finally, the benefits of (also) looking at the wicked side of things will be discussed.
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1. Visions and Bitter Realities: Citizen Engagement in
the News-Making Process
Save Journalism! I remember a dear colleague wearing a
shirt with that slogan at a conference sometime during
the early 2000s. And, if I remember correctly, I wore the
exact same shirt at the very same conference, as he had a
full set of these with him. There was a certain heroic and
noble Samaritan attitude connected to wearing it, and
it also felt a little bit “punk”—or at least as punk as aca-
demics at conferences dare to be between conference
cookies and presentationmarathons.Wewanted to save
something important, a societal institution that seemed
to be falling apart both economically and democratically.
This feeling of urgency, paired with excitement and
hope for a new beginning, was not uncommon at
that time. For the younger generation of journalism re-
searchers, “legacy” media seemed to be stuck in com-
pletely crystallized traditions and was awfully outdated,
especially in contrast to the exciting new things devel-
oping on the Internet. These hungry academics turned
their attention to online journalism, a phenomenon that
was still very much emerging and seemed very promis-
ing, as it allowed for totally new forms of storytelling
and involved users as partners in the news-making pro-
cess (Bowman &Willis, 2003; Deuze, 2003; Pavlik, 2001).
The very word “users” felt revolutionary, as the older
generation of academics still thought of them as “recipi-
ents” who swallowed whatever the media machine spit
out (Schönbach, 1997, 2001). As an added bonus, the
online journalists themselves were young and hungry,
so there was a kind of mutual generational understand-
ing. In some ways, the upcoming new breed of journal-
ism researchers might have seen themselves reflected in
the online journalists; they also tried to inject innovative
ideas into an established, but sluggish, system working
against a notable vis inertiae to set it in motion again.
Indeed, initial resistance made the lives of this pio-
neer generation of online journalists quite hard. Estab-
lished journalists from print, radio, and TV news didn’t
take their online colleagues seriously; some even de-
tested the change and hoped it would simply go away.
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Equally, politicians, public relations officers, and other
stakeholders largely ignored the “new kids on the block”;
therewere stories of online journalists not even being ad-
mitted to press conferences, being seated somewhere in
the back, or being perceived as “computer nerds” (Deg-
gerich, 2001a, 2001b). However, this situation changed
rather quickly in just a few years. With the economic
struggles of the parent media, the exodus of classifieds
to online services, the mainstream adoption of Internet
use, and the respective growth of use time, online jour-
nalism became accepted and even took over the lead
role in many ways beyond the obvious production speed
(e.g., Allan, 2006; Bivens, 2008; Hermida, 2010).
Despite (or maybe because of) this success story, the
reality of participatory online news some 15 years later
is very different from the early visions; notable forms of
“produsage” (Bruns, 2008) and user-generated content
seem to be largely missing from professional journalis-
tic websites. The comment sections of online news me-
dia are flooded with hateful messages, opinion monger-
ing, and incivility (e.g., Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Har-
low, 2015; Neurauter-Kessels, 2013; Santana, 2014). And
what’s worse, there are even presumed cases of strategic
manipulation attempts of community sections by foreign
states and related actors (Elliott, 2014). Some observers
even regard this as a new information war happening in
the guise of user participation (Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012;
Zelenkauskaite & Balduccini, 2017). As a result, many
news media restricted user participation or even gave
up their comment sections altogether. Notable examples
are Reuters, Bloomberg, The Guardian (certain topics),
Stern (Germany), De Volkskrant (Netherlands), News24
(South Africa), and The Moscow Times (Russia). While
non-proprietary platforms, like Facebook, Youtube, Insta-
gram or Twitter, may offer an alternative route for news
distribution and participation, as compared to comment
sections controlled by the media themselves, the neg-
ativity and toxic atmosphere there can be equally bad,
and multiple studies imply that the deliberative quality
is even lower, as is the interaction with journalists who
seem to neglect such channels even when they are of-
ficially supported by their media (Esau, Friess & Eilders,
2017; Hille & Bakker, 2013; Rowe, 2015; Su et al., 2018).
Broadly speaking, the idea of free, high-quality user-
generated content in the context of professional online
news media is seemingly half dead. Naturally, there are
promising projects outside traditional news outlets, but
often these are driven by activists’ interests in specific
topics or they are small-scale, profit-driven news or PR
ventures (as is often the casewith online influencer chan-
nels on social media or special-interest blogs).
So, what went wrong? Maybe not much beyond hu-
man beings and societal reality not following some en-
thusiastic and rather utopian ideas. As I will discuss in
this article, the issue predominantly lies with false expec-
tations. Media managers’ economic fantasies of a will-
ing, free workforce were equally misguided as the rather
naïve academic notions of a revitalized journalism in di-
rect debate with its active users; both sacrificed empir-
ical realism for fantasies that were driven by their own
goals and hopes resulting in either a greedy or an ideal-
istic projection (Section 2). As an antidote, I will propose
and systematize the concept of “dark participation”—the
evil flip side of citizen engagement (Section 3). This de-
construction of earlier, naïve ideas (to whom the author
contributed himself) is deliberately one-sided; by adding
some black to the pearly-white idealism of citizen en-
gagement, one might end up with a more appropriate
grey. While less exciting, this allows for a more nuanced
understanding of participation, and in the end, amore re-
alistic approach that allows for actual change (Section 4).
2. Limitations of Citizen Engagement as a Concept:
Failures of the Light Side
The current situation did not come without warning
signs. Earlier research revealed a reluctance among pro-
fessionals to give up control in the production process
and a rather limited willingness of audience members
to participate for free in this process (Singer et al.,
2011). Instead of the ambitious full participation in the
news-making process, many companies simply set up
“walled gardens” for limited participation in comment
sections (Domingo et al., 2008; Hanitzsch & Quandt,
2012). The more active prod/users (Bruns, 2008) often
chose to completely bypass journalism (Pavlik, 2000)
and disseminate their idea of news via social networks
and other online services (one prominent current ex-
ample is a notoriously Twittering president), thereby
questioning the monopoly and the very idea of profes-
sionalized news production by journalistic institutions.
In many ways, entrepreneurial journalism—sometimes
a precarious existence under de-institutionalized work
conditions—echoes the impact of this cultural change
(Cohen, 2015). So the empirical reality of user participa-
tion was a different one from the expectations for years
now—and arguably, even from the beginning.
However, the problem cannot be simply attributed
to a brilliant concept gone astray, as if a wonderful ma-
chinery just corroded into a deplorable state of mal-
functioning. Rather, the whole proposition of grassroots
journalism was one-sided from the beginning; it was a
democratic and economic utopia that primarily revolved
around the journalistic perspective and academic wish-
ful thinking (Peters & Witschge, 2014). Löffelholz (2004)
noted early on that the broad notion of a “redactional
society” (Hartley, 2000) had a weak empirical and the-
oretical foundation. In most of the forward-looking con-
cepts, the “user” was indeed a projection—either an al-
truistic democrat in constant Samaritan mode or a par-
ticle in a willing workforce contributing to the journal-
ist’s own processes as a free resource. It may be argued
that suchprojections primarilymirrored academic or eco-
nomic Shangri-las that did not take the users as human
beings seriously enough. As Gans (2003) noted, ideal
democracies would have ideal citizens, but such ideals
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are meant to set societal goals, and therefore, remain in-
tentionally simplistic. Actual (i.e., “real”) societal life is
much more complex (Gans, 2003), and most citizens are
not motivated to fulfil the democratic ideal per se by gra-
tuitously helping journalists inform their fellow citizens.
It seems rather plausible that many would prefer to do
something rather mundane instead (like relaxing after
their daily paid work with a cool drink, watching televi-
sion, meeting with friends etc.).1
However, such common-sense, down-to-earth think-
ing was not particularly popular in most of the early
concepts of user participation in the news-making pro-
cess; most of them were enthusiastically aiming for the
sky. The reasons for this are multifaceted. Some major
fallacies of the enthusiastic concepts of the late 1990s
and early 2000s were biased observations driven by self-
interest (idealistic or economic), projecting potentials
and options as social reality, a rather weak consideration
of the psychological and societal basis of human action,
a lack of empirical work in concomitance with an abun-
dance of conceptual work, and a disregard of the rea-
sons for the institutionalization and professionalization
of journalism.
As noted above, the idealistic bias on the part of aca-
demics was, in part, driven by their own interests and
hopes regarding a democratic transformation and rejuve-
nation of journalism. This, perhaps naïve, approach may
be also linked to themain protagonists at that time being
primarily a younger generation of tech-savvy researchers.
In contrast to many of their seniors, they had day-to-day
experience with online communication, a more natural
approach to computer technology (as they, themselves,
were more or less digital natives), and based on their
career stage, many were also eager to do things differ-
ently. Leaving behind the dusty environment of journal-
istic dinosaurs in traditional newsrooms and turning to-
wards the dynamic, evolving new animals in the online
world was certainly attractive. Also, their focus on the
new came quite naturally with a preference for the ex-
ceptional over the normal. Their research was abundant
in case-study examples of innovative best-practice exam-
ples of online news production and user participation
and fewer with large-scale overviews of the overall state
of the news media business.2
The media business’ bias was certainly a different
one. The fantasies of media managers were economic
ones (Domingo et al., 2008; Vujnovic et al., 2010) that re-
garded the user as a cheap resource in the work process,
basically producing content like “magic” out of nothing
(Quandt, 2011). Naturally, there was an inherent cost-
reduction idea involved here, that is, replacing paid jour-
nalists with voluntarily working users. Also, the walled
gardens of comment sections were primarily meant as
a means to promote customer loyalty, not as place for
democratic debate that included both professional jour-
nalists and citizens (Singer et al., 2011). It is no won-
der that the ideas of “user-generated content” and “par-
ticipation” discussed in academia resonated well within
parts of the industry (albeit for the wrong reasons). To
put it more bluntly, while most academics meant “saving
journalism” and “strengthening democracy”, some me-
dia managers heard “saving money” and “strengthening
our business”.
In addition to this, there was also a certain lemming-
like3 mentality in somemedia houses; as more andmore
news outlets introduced comment sections and partic-
ipatory formats, it became fashionable to do this, and
many just did it because everybody else did it. This band-
wagon effectwas quite pronounced; not to be left behind
and having the appearance of being “modern” was often
the primarymotivation. This sometimes led to bizarre sit-
uations. As a researcher in the field, I was once contacted
by an editor of a small publishing house to help them
participate in participation. When being asked why they
wanted to include user input in the first place, the ed-
itor answered (somewhat irritated): “Because the man-
agement wants it like that” (Quandt, 2012). I labeled this
strategy “something 2.0” back then (Quandt, 2012)—a
principle that probably could be transferred to “anything
x.0” even today.
The rather different goals notwithstanding, both ap-
proaches, by academia and the industry, were equally
confusing technological options and economic potential
with social reality. The differentiation between these
(and the analysis of their complex interplay) is proba-
bly one of the most fundamental ideas of science and
technology studies (STS), but their equalization remains
a commonmistake. The fallacy of confusing options with
social realities is not just bound to technological inno-
vations, though it runs deeper and is connected to a
general perspective on human beings. Indeed, even in
the early works of moral and political philosophy, it has
been argued that there are reasons why societies come
into existence and why people participate in larger, or-
ganized contexts. Centuries of this work led to the con-
clusion that participation does not automatically come
free of charge, but is motivated by specific human in-
terests and qualities and framed by the necessities of
growing social structures. The darker view in the tra-
dition of Hobbes’ (1651/2008) Leviathan paints a self-
1 This comment is not meant to downplay the considerable motivation of citizens to contribute to social causes, charity, welfare organizations etc.; how-
ever, there are significant differences of such activities to working for free for (mostly) profit-driven news organizations. One may also argue that such
activities are much more “tangible” and the beneficial effects less abstract than “saving democracy through participation in journalism”.
2 An example of such case-oriented approaches can be found in the two edited books by Paterson and Domingo on online newsroom ethnographies
(Paterson & Domingo, 2008; Domingo & Paterson, 2011). These two books were significant in developing the field of ethnographic research, so this is
not at all meant as a criticism of their approach (full disclosure: I even contributed a study to Paterson & Domingo, 2008). On the contrary; the argument
here is rather a criticism of what is not there or at least lacking, that is, more critical work putting such approaches to innovation in journalism into
perspective, thus balancing that period’s work more.
3 This expression is borrowed from a reviewer comment and was included here as it mirrors my own experiences with industry contacts during that time
quite well.
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ish, interest-driven, and competitive picture of humans
in their natural state with the societal rules and struc-
tures being borne out of “cold” reason and resulting in
submission to authority. Rousseau’s (1762/2018) Social
Contract paints a much more positive image of the nat-
ural human state—peaceful, empathic, free, and non-
competitive—and acknowledges the realities of evolv-
ing societies, but it aims for an idealized democracy be-
yond the corruption of social realities. One could argue
that many researchers (perhaps unknowingly) followed
Rousseau’s ideals in their concepts of participation, hop-
ing that citizens would be intrinsically motivated, as if
they were still in an idealized natural state. Interestingly
enough, even the economic fantasies ofmediamanagers
seemed to take participation as an intrinsic value for
granted, which is somewhat ironic considering that eco-
nomic thinking is often firmly rooted in a concept of hu-
mans as primarily competitive and selfish.
However, one does not have to follow the darker
Hobbesian idea (or indeed, refer to moral philosophy at
all) to realize that there is a difference between an ideal-
ized human condition and social reality. Various factors
influence the news-production process, and the enthusi-
astic approach to online participation reduced this to the
technological potential of users taking part in the pro-
cess (Domingo et al., 2008) and somehow freeing them
from the one-sided production of traditional journalism.
However, that process is not just a result of technologi-
cal necessity, but, on a structural level, of labor organi-
zation, and on a personal level, of motivation; so there
are many reasons why not everybody can or should be
a journalist.
Indeed, as noted above, the idea of user participa-
tion was neither acknowledging the value of profession-
alization enough (actually, it very much opposed it) nor
did it consider the results of psychological research on
motivation. The inner urge to participate in the public
debate (Bowman & Willis, 2003; Deuze, Bruns, & Neu-
berger, 2007), that is, to provide commercially operat-
ing news media with free content, was taken for granted
based on the assumption as a quasi-requirement for the
citizen of modern society—aka “our democratic duty.”4
As a result, crucial questions did not receive enough at-
tention: did many people show an urgent and obvious
interest in news production? Why should users actually
contribute something to professional news media, and
what incentive would drive them to actually do this? Or,
more bluntly put: why should anybody want to be a “cit-
izen journalist”? The answers might have been quite dif-
ferent from the enthusiastic theoretical concepts. Actu-
ally, participation of a majority of the citizens simply for
intrinsic reasons might have been highly unlikely, and
external incentives were lacking or half-heartedly imple-
mented (like a gamification of participation via rank sys-
tems). The lack of interest in usermotivations in the early
2000s may be partially explained by the fact that most of
the researchers in that particular field had a background
in journalism research or even practical journalism; in
many cases, their focus was still on the journalists and
news media organizations with user-generated content
becoming a part of that context (i.e., a notable resource
in the production process that was still very much intact)
(Domingo et al., 2008). This is actually inherent in the
term “citizen journalist”; that is, it was thought that the
people would become lay journalists and therefore as-
similate into the system. This stands in stark contrast to
the work of media effects researchers some ten years
later where information sharing via social media is pri-
marily conceptualized as a form of “private” online be-
havior and not as a form of public “news production” (of-
ten not being much different from what was discussed a
decade before, except that it is happening in a different
context, i.e., social media vs. legacy news media).
The sometimes rather broad re-conceptualizations
of journalism were not backed up by empirical proof in
most cases. Actually, there was a certain lack of empiri-
cal research beyond individual case analyses, especially
in the early years of the development. As mentioned
above, the initial focus on case studies and “outstand-
ing” best-practice examples pronounced the extreme,
neglecting the (potentially boring, but more prevalent)
normal. One may still argue that in the beginning of a
development, a heightened interest in the avant-garde is
crucial to understand change. However, if such a nucleus
of change is not contrasted with the overall state of the
field, one might misinterpret innovations and their rele-
vance (as a standard of comparison is missing). Indeed,
some larger studies in the subsequent years cast doubt
on the acceptance of user participation in news media
and the motivation of users to contribute anything be-
yond comments (Karlsson, Bergström, Clerwall, & Fast,
2015; Nielsen, 2014; Singer et al., 2011). At least in some
countries, the journalists themselves were very skeptical
about the usefulness of user contributions and their par-
ticipation in online forums. Some were even doubtful of
the citizens’ principal potential to produce meaningful
content (Singer et al., 2011).
On the one hand, one may perceive this as protec-
tionism and a defensive reaction to the new competi-
tion with low- or non-paid workers. On the other hand,
there are reasons for the existence of institutionalized
journalism and why a profession usually is not only paid
for, but also requires some form of qualification and skill.
While the access to journalism does not depend on a for-
mal qualification in many countries, there is vocational
training on the job or even academic training available
that teaches and reflects the rules and skillsets devel-
oped over the centuries as part of the profession. The
4 The more recent concept of “reciprocal journalism“ by Lewis, Holton and Coddington (2014) gives some alternative answers on a conceptual level.
Again, the perspective here is structural rather than individual or motivational, but it acknowledges the benefit for users and followers and therefore
does not reduce the analysis to a one-sided perspective on the (professional) production side. As Lewis (2015) pointed out, reciprocity can be also
negative and anti-social—an argument that resonates well with the ideas discussed here.
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idea that journalism only requires specific personal qual-
ifications was rejected by research long ago (Weaver &
Gray, 1980), so it’s hardly surprising that untrained lay-
men (citizen journalists) may not contribute polishedma-
terial that is ready for publication even if they are moti-
vated to do so. This lack of ability, not simply motivation,
was part of the discussion about participation early on
(Singer et al., 2011). Some media just expected citizens
to participate in the form of delivering rawmaterial such
as information on events, photos, eye-witness accounts,
and feedback. In addition to individual qualifications nec-
essary to do the job, professionalization also means insti-
tutionalization. The process of news production typically
requires various skills, so the division of work plus a cor-
responding specialization is a natural result of growing
news businesses; it’s no wonder research revealed that
in online journalism, specific work routines and produc-
tion roles were quickly established on the basis of neces-
sities and the logic of efficient work practices (Quandt,
2005). Similar processes were happening in blog-based,
independent news outlets. Often these started as one-
or few-person businesses, but with growth and success,
they reinvented typical work routines ofmore traditional
media houses and implemented horizontal and verti-
cal differentiation.
In short, the enthusiastic concepts of citizen partici-
pation in the news-making process were partially short-
sighted and ignored some framework conditions of pro-
fessional, journalistic production processes, sometimes
by virtue of idealism and sometimes due to an under-
estimation of the complex interplay of individual, struc-
tural, and social processes. However, hindsight is easier
than foresight: The criticism here is based on retrospect,
which always has the benefit of knowing the results, as
well as the process that led to it. And while the concept
of intrinsicallymotivated citizen participationmight have
been naïve, it was certainly important to initiate a dis-
cussion about the potential of innovative forms of news
production and the importance of re-connecting journal-
ismwith the public. The subsequent debates on journalis-
tic responsibility and community orientationwere impor-
tant to reveal issues of déformation professionelle and
journalistic arrogance and can be regarded as part of a
healthy re-calibration process.
There is a next step in this debate, though, and it
somewhat turns the previous argument and perspec-
tive completely upside down. Lately, there is empiri-
cal and theoretical insight that points to quite success-
ful forms of participation (at least from the perspective
of the participants). However, these are not motivated
by a belief in the democratic necessity of journalistic
news production or an idealized citizen. On the contrary,
they are often rooted in rather sinister motives and
anti-democratic worldviews of the participating actors.
In contrast to what was described above, these actors
are often highly motivated and organized, so they actu-
ally have clear reasons to engage in “information” and
“news” production.
3. Dark Participation: Concept and Systematization
The bleak flip side to the utopian concept of selfless par-
ticipation in a redactional society (Hartley, 2000) as out-
lined above, could be called “dark participation”. As re-
search has revealed, this type of participation seems to
be growing parallel to the recent wave of populism in
Western democracies (Jouët, 2018; Manucci & Weber,
2017; Meltzer, 2014). Instead of positive, or at least neu-
tral, contributions to the news-making processes, it is
characterized by negative, selfish or even deeply sinis-
ter contributions such as “trolling” (Coles & West, 2016;
Mihaylov & Nakov, 2016), strategic “piggy-backing” on
journalistic reputation, and large-scale disinformation in
uncontrolled news environments (Aro, 2016; Coe et al.,
2014; Muddiman & Stroud, 2017). But why is that so? In
parallel to the question regarding the “enthusiastic” par-
ticipation model, one might ask more specifically: why
does a non-professional actor with malevolent motives
want to participate in the news-making process? And
who are these alleged “citizens”?
In the following, I will sketch some initial cases that
may hint at plausible answers before systematizing the
concept of dark participation further. The examples that
could be labelled dark participation range from misinfor-
mation and hate campaigns to individual trolling and cy-
berbullying. Many of these have been subject to recent
public debate.
In 2014, The Guardian publicly announced that they
found a high number of strategically placed, manipu-
lative user posts in their comment sections. Through-
out the Ukrainian crisis, the level of pro-Russian posts
seemed to be disproportional, and there was evidence
that linked these posts to the Russian government, or
at least their support groups (Elliott, 2014). The work
of pro-Russian “web brigades” or “troll armies” was ob-
served early on (Franke & Pallin, 2012; Kelly et al., 2012;
Sanovich, 2017; Shakarian, 2011), and the actions of
the St. Petersburg based Internet Research Agency—
basically an organized troll farm—received broad atten-
tion after being exposed by Western journalists (Walker,
2015). The aim of these “participators” was to influence
the Western public and (potentially) the journalists, ac-
cording to the Russian state goals, in other words, ba-
sically a form of covert political propaganda. However,
the Internet Research Agency is certainly not the only
notable case; the list of similar examples is long (Erjavec
& Kovačič, 2012; Zelenkauskaite & Balduccini, 2017) as
is the list of presumed actors and groups (Weedon, Nu-
land, & Stamos, 2017), ranging from state propagandists
and political extremists to religious groups and conspir-
acy theorists all over the globe (see also Quandt & Festl,
2017). Misinformation and propaganda can also take
the form of hate campaigns that attack specific groups
or individuals that symbolize these groups (Quandt &
Festl, 2017).
There are also many cases wheremisinformation has
been spread via social networks and short messaging
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services (especially Twitter) either as “fake news” that
was published under the name of news media (Allcott
& Gentzkow, 2017; Murtha, 2016) or as information in-
tended to be picked up by media as genuine eye-witness
reports or user opinions (Ellis, 2017; Gowen & Bearak,
2017). Sneaking fake information into journalism by im-
itating trusted or innocent sources is a well-known pro-
paganda strategy (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012) and can be
seen as a particularly sinister form of dark participation.
The originators plant false or misleading information and
abuse the public’s trust in journalistic brands. In addition
to the potential impact when successfully manipulating
journalists and getting their message into the news, the
originators also cover their tracks and become invisible
to outside observers.
Beyond these forms of obviously strategic, manipu-
lative participation, there are also some reports of gen-
uine trolling and bullying via comment sections. The
motivations of forum trolls (Cheng, Bernstein, Danescu-
Niculescu-Mizil, & Leskovec, 2017) have not received
much attention in journalism research, but there are
some revealing reports on individual cases (as an exam-
ple, see Steppat, 2014). These paint the picture of an-
gry, malevolent participants who project their personal
issues and a general hatred for fellow human beings or
“the system” onto others with a grimwill to stir up forum
debates. Also, trolling seems to be sometimesmotivated
by the simple enjoyment of causing turmoil and seeing
others react to aggressive or nonsensical posts (Buckels,
Trapnell, & Paulhus, 2014). In addition to this, forums
are sometimes the scene of targeted bullying. In con-
trast to trolling, cyberbullying is “intended to harass an
‘inferior’ victim”; it is “an intentional and deliberate act”
that happens “more than once” and is directed “against
a physically or socially inferior victim” (Festl & Quandt,
2017, p. 329; see also Smith, Mahdavi, Carvalho, Fisher,
& Russell, 2008; Tokunaga, 2010). Unsurprisingly, there
are no clear boundaries between trolling and cyberbully-
ing. However, while trolls sometimes attack other forum
members in their “arguments”, their actions do not re-
peatedly target one specific individual in order to harass
that person; their primary goal is to cause trouble. Both
of these types of dark participation can be differentiated
from the above mentioned strategic forms of cyber hate,
which are:
Typically embedded in the actions of larger,
more enduring hate movements or hate cam-
paigns…and…targeted at whole groups defined by
criteria such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and
so on—and (mostly) not at single victims or at singular
events. (Quandt & Festl, 2017, p. 336)
In contrast to trolling and bullying, strategic manipula-
tion “serves an ideological, political, or religious goal”
(Quandt & Festl, 2017, p. 338), so if individuals are at-
tacked, they typically “stand for” a target group or an op-
posing principle (i.e., they signify “the enemy”).
These examples point to the comment sections as a
central target of dark participation. There are reasons for
this; the comment sections are a good object of manip-
ulation and hate because they basically offer an already
established, large audience “for free” for strategic agita-
tors and trolls. The environment also has the blessing of
an established news source; that is, dark participators
benefit from the media brand and the environment it of-
fers. Also, due to the closure of the journalistic process
to very limited walled gardens of user debate, the com-
ment sections are often the only directly accessible step
of the production chain (Singer et al., 2011). Some indi-
rect influence can also be exerted by feeding tampered
material to online media under the disguise of ordinary
citizens or eye witnesses (as noted above), but depend-
ing on the level of fact checking, this might be a more
difficult route.
Similar to the comment sections, malevolent par-
ticipators might invade social media channels provid-
ing news items. Shared content on Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, etc. is subject to comparable “dark” comment-
ing strategies, and in many ways, the situation is worse
there because the news originators cannot exert the
same level of control as in their own proprietary com-
ment sections. Additionally, social media channels often
give access to all levels of the production chain (as de-
scribed in Singer et al., 2011) offering the option to pub-
lish news pieces without the involvement of professional
journalists, therefore fully bypassing legacy media, or to
release fake news or manipulated news pieces under the
name of professional journalists and established media
(Quandt, Frischlich, Boberg, & Schatto-Eckrodt, in press).
Through the above examples (misinformation, hate
campaigns, trolling, cyberbullying), the shape and fo-
cal areas of dark participation become roughly visible.
However, it is important to explore the concept beyond
the idiosyncrasies of the individual case examples in or-
der to not fall into the same trap as the primarily case
driven “enthusiastic” research on participation. There-
fore, in the following, I would like to dissect the vari-
ants of dark participation in more detail by differentiat-
ing several main dimensions: (a) wicked actors, (b) sinis-
ter motives and reasons for participation, (c) despicable
objects/targets, (d) intended audience(s), and (e) nefar-
ious processes/actions (Figure 1). Such a systematic ap-
proach provides an understanding of the huge variety
and differences in various phenomena that fall into the
category of dark participation. While exploring these di-
mensions, I will also briefly discuss some of the knowl-
edge we already have on them (albeit some of the find-
ings are, indeed, still limited).
3.1. Actors
As indicated by the above case examples, actors of dark
participation vary from individuals and organized groups
to synchronized movements (and corresponding larger
groups). Individual actors may be single trolls or hate
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Figure 1. Variants of dark participation.
mongers with varying backgrounds,motivations, and par-
ticipation behaviors thatmay be idiosyncratic (as they are
rooted in the respective person’s biography and circum-
stance). Still, there are specific types of individual trolls;
some are obviously using hate postings to compensate
for personal discontent (Steppat, 2014), while others ap-
pear to find it satisfying to stir up trouble or manipulate
others (Buckels et al., 2014). The typical Internet troll is
thought to be a single “lone wolf” (Steppat, 2014), but
especially, “fun trolling” might not be as misanthropic as
“hate trolling”, and therefore, it is also open to group be-
havior. Such small groups of actors are also not uncom-
mon as perpetrators in cyberbullying. A cooperation prin-
ciple, including active bullies and supportive audience
members (Festl & Quandt, 2017), is inherent to many
bullying constellations with the perpetrator group being
united by the joint action against specific targets. Joint
action in various forms of dark participation also extends
to larger groups that can be described as part of a po-
litical, religious, or ideological movement. Manipulative
forms of participation in online forums are often strate-
gically planned and synchronized. The above-mentioned
actions of Russian propaganda brigades, but also of var-
ious other covert state agencies, right-wing populists, or
conspiracy theorists are usually not simple coincidence
(Gorwa, 2017; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Pingaud &
Sauer, 2016). They follow a specific sequence and logic,
apply well-calculated messages that serve a specific goal,
and are not as unpredictable as individual trolls.
3.2. Reasons and Motives
The motives and reasons for dark participation vary no-
tably with the actor groups. Individuals are plausibly
more prone to something that might be labeled “authen-
tic” evil attacks; that is, their actions are morally bad
and driven by genuine personal hate for others or the
sheer pleasure of making others suffer (Craker & March,
2016; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012). In contrast to a planned
group action, such attacks do not follow a rational logic,
and from the outside, they may appear random, affec-
tive, and/or psychotic. Other forms of dark participation
are much more controlled or planned; the reasons may
still be situational or short term in some cases, but they
are following specific tactics (as is the case with some in-
stances of bullying) (Festl & Quandt, 2017). Large scale
manipulation campaigns are strategic by definition, and
while such forms are often particularly sinister, they still
apply a rational (cold) logic and process (Quandt & Festl,
2017). Organized hate speech in online forums applies
demeaning language intentionally, and hate in this con-
text is not to be confused with situational rage (although
it seems to be emotionally loaded,which is part of a strat-
egy to appeal to specific target groups).
3.3. Objects and Targets
The objects and targets of both mis/disinformation and
negative/covert comments have to be discerned from
the intended audience(s) of dark participation. Depend-
ing on the motives of wicked actors, the objects can be
normal topics of reporting or hand-picked targets (like
political or societal representatives that are exemplary
for a despicable group or principle). Trolls and manip-
ulators may attack specific articles or topics, and they
can also divert content-driven hate to actors mentioned
in the article or the journalists themselves. A typical ex-
ample of this is the behavior of right-wing commenters
who target articles on refugees (Devlin & Grant, 2017;
Toepfl & Piwoni, 2017), and depending on the article’s
tone, also attack the journalists as being responsible for
the content and its tone. In Germany, this basic principle
was generalized in the form of the Lügenpresse (press of
liars) accusation, especially advanced by the right-wing,
anti-Islam and anti-refugeemovement, PEGIDA (see also
Quandt et al., in press). Here, the press and journalism
in general became representative of an adverse system
and the intended target of the negativity.
Media and Communication, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 36–48 42
3.4. Audiences
The intended audience is often different from targeted
persons or groups, and again, can range from individu-
als to groups to whole societies (see also Quandt & Festl,
2017). A typical example is forum participation by strate-
gic actors. They first criticize an article (let’s say, in the
case of the Russian web brigades, a piece on Putin pub-
lished in a German web magazine), transfer the criticism
to the journalist as originator (claiming that her/his re-
porting was biased), and then escalate this to a systemic
level (insinuating that this is typical for biased reporting
on Russia in Germany).5 So the direct, initial target is
the article itself, but then it is diverted to indirect tar-
gets (journalists, themedia, the system). However, the in-
tended audience of such posts may be different from the
targets. It could be the other forum participants, as part
of the respective population and potential multiplicators,
but also the journalists themselves (by giving them the
impression that their reporting is not in line with their
audience’s perceptions and wishes) or maybe even third
parties (who might hear about the user reactions from
media reports). The effects of such forms of dark par-
ticipation may be slow and indirect, following the “con-
stant dripping wears away a stone” principle (Stelzen-
müller, 2017), but they may affect whole societies as the
intended audience. Here, one goal is potentially chang-
ing the reference system of what can and should be said
in a society, and the framing of these discussions (i.e., in
the long term, a societal norm shift).
3.5. Process
From the previous points, it is apparent that there are
varying strategies when it comes to the processes of
dark participation, from single, limited events to long-
term strategies of subversion, in line with the underly-
ing motives of the actors, the targeted objects, and the
intended audiences. Individual hate trolling as an unpre-
dictable series of psychotic outbreaks may be unstruc-
tured and random, whereas tactically motivated inter-
ventions are typically structured, but still bound by the
specifics of the situation. Strategic forms of dark partici-
pation, on the other hand, are systematic and long-term
processes. Feeding journalists tampered information or
influencing forum participations according to one’s own
ideology may require advance planning, careful execu-
tion, and repetition to achieve the strategic goals (Mar-
wick & Lewis, 2017).
This very brief differentiation of themost relevant dimen-
sions and variants of dark participation hints at a large va-
riety of phenomena that may be grouped under that la-
bel. Obviously, there are cognate concepts, like disinfor-
mation, propaganda, and populism (Jowett & O’Donnell,
2012) or fake news (Rubin, Chen, & Conroy, 2015), but
these are linked to different academic debates and per-
spectives. In this article, I deliberately focused the phe-
nomena through the lens of participation, that is, “taking
part in something else” such as the news production pro-
cess, and I did so to contrast the dark sidewith the enthu-
siastic debate. It should have become apparent by now
that the potential for dark participation is enormous and
that there is also empirical proof that it may be quite suc-
cessful, with intrinsically motivated actors eager to par-
ticipate and contribute (but just not in the way journal-
ism researchers dreamt of).
In contrast to the enthusiastic concepts of participa-
tion, the question, “why would anyone want to partici-
pate?” is much easier to answer for dark participation.
The former was (at least implicitly) relying on the aver-
age user as an idealized democratic citizen who is willing
to contribute for a higher good and out of an intrinsic
motivation—an assumption that has obvious flaws un-
der real life conditions. The latter does not rely on an
idealistic general audience as participators, but is driven
by very particular, often selfish interests of specific indi-
viduals and groups. The dark participators have extreme
ideas and messages, and they try to get these out into
the public with missionary zeal and by any means neces-
sary. So while the enthusiastic concept of participation
expected exceptional motivation from the normal audi-
ence, dark participation merely assumes motivated ex-
ceptions from the norm. As such a requirement for the
concept is easily met, the future for dark participation is,
paradoxically, bright.
4. Beyond Doom and Gloom: Save Journalism, Save
the World?
Hateful comments, manipulation of forums, and fabri-
cated information seem to be common features of user
participation in the news-making process these days.
These and other variants of dark participation are ap-
parently on the rise. While journalism researchers in the
1990s and 2000s enthusiastically hoped for a rejuvena-
tion of journalism and a strengthening of democracy by
means of citizen participation in a positive and civil de-
bate, anecdotal evidence and empirical research have
pointed in exactly the opposite direction recently (Gar-
diner et al., 2016; Karlsson et al., 2015; Rowe, 2015; Su
et al., 2018). As a result, somemedia limit their options of
participation to thewalled gardens of user comments, fil-
ter andmoderate user posts, or install fact-checking units
to double and triple analyze user-generated content for
authenticity (Newman, 2017; Santana, 2016; Wolfgang,
2018)—a seemingly desperate attempt at putting the
genie back into the bottle. Indeed, the situation seems
5 This example is not a hypothetical one; it was communicated to a research team on web-based propaganda where I serve as one of the PIs
(http://www.propstop.de/?lang=en), actually by several directly affected journalists. So it seems to be a common observation, and not just an indi-
vidual case. However, the journalists reported many more comparable cases, by various actors, and not just the Russian web brigades; one has to be
careful to not attribute this to a single group or nation.
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to be grim, and many observers these days note that
the Internet has become an unfriendly and hostile place
(Rainie, Anderson, & Albright, 2017) that is full of hate
and fake news (Lazer et al., 2018; Seely, 2018); positive
participation sometimes looks like lost cause.
Given my ruthless criticism of early participation re-
search at the beginning of this article, you might think
that this assessment actually suits me as the author of
a personal vendetta piece. Indeed, this article has been,
in part, a very personal reckoning with earlier work on
participation. I myself contributed to the enthusiastic de-
bate on “saving journalism” through citizen participation
and new online concepts. As noted, this idealistic per-
spective was well intended, but partially misguided and
naïve. By introducing the concept of dark participation,
I tried to show that there is a large variety of participation
behaviors that are evil, malevolent, and destructive—at
least if one believes in the value of democracy and free,
impartial information flow. The examples and systemati-
zation paralleled previous analyses of positive options,
but completely flipped them around (Domingo et al.,
2008; Quandt, 2011; Singer et al., 2011). This was an in-
tentional deconstruction.
If you now believe that the future is all doom and
gloom, then you have stepped into a trap I intention-
ally set.
The examples of dark participation point to urgent
issues of current online communication and news pro-
cesses, and there is sufficient proof that these issues are
more than serious. Without any doubt, it is highly nec-
essary to research them. However, the current wave of
apocalyptic analyses of media and society are partially
born out of the same fallacies that plagued the early en-
thusiastic approaches. Again, researchers want to “save
something important, a societal institution that seems to
be falling apart both economically and democratically”
(as noted in the very beginning of this piece); the differ-
ence now is that they are focusing on the many diabolic
problems and not a messianic solution (which are, ironi-
cally, the two sides of the very same coin—participation).
Science has fads that come in waves, and with the dis-
appointment regarding earlier concepts and hopes, re-
searchers again feel that these earlier ideas were stuck
in crystallized traditions. Positive forms of participation
now seem awfully outdated, and the many threats of on-
line communication are the latest and, seemingly, the
most important trend.
The issue here is not the (most relevant) topic of
dark participation itself, but a growing lopsidedness that
repeats the earlier failings in approach, just with an in-
versed object of interest. One has to wonder, if there are,
again, “biased observations driven by self-interests, pro-
jecting potentials and options as social reality, a rather
weak consideration of the psychological and societal ba-
sis of human action, a lack of empirical work in concomi-
tancewith an abundance of conceptualwork, and a disre-
gard of the reasons for the institutionalization andprofes-
sionalization of journalism” (to quote the ruthless reck-
oning in Section 2)?
Indeed, when looking at certain current obsessions
with fake news, populism, and hate, one may be inclined
to answer at least some of these questionswith a “yes”—
maybe a conditional one, but still a “yes.” Some of the
current wave of research on hate speech in user com-
ments, Twitter manipulation, or online propaganda con-
sistently fails to offer a benchmark on how relevant these
cases are in relation to the overall information flow. By
pointing out that thousands or even millions of tweets
are without a factual basis, they do not prove much be-
yond common knowledge; andwith extremely low usage
numbers in some countries, even millions of tweets are
basically read by negligible fragments of the public. Sim-
ilarly, research on the impact of bots and fake profiles
often projects the potentials and options as social real-
ity. Many of the studies in the field primarily offer case-
study examples, and even concrete numbers on the per-
centage of social bots and fake profiles in specific com-
ment sections or social media channels do not give a
scale for their actual effect on society. Once again, me-
dia and communication research must be careful that it
is not taking the exception as the rule.
I hope that you do not take this thewrongway. These
types of research are important, even essential, as are
other analyses of dark participation6, and they help us
in understanding societal changes under the conditions
of an increasingly “total” media logic. However, as re-
searchers, we should be careful to not make the ex-
act same mistakes over and over again. To basically fol-
low the earlier path of research, but in a reversed logic,
would mean throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Journalism and the world as we know it are not
saved by academic enthusiasm alone; neither are they
destroyed by scientific (and public) doom and gloom.
What the discussion on participatory journalism—and in-
deed, the role of news in a technologically and socially
changed world—needs is more balance. A normalization
of the debate and maturity beyond uni-polar depictions
of theworld is essential. As such, the concept of dark par-
ticipation introduced here was, indeed, part of a trick ar-
gument. At first, it just reveals that there is a bleak flip-
side to the enthusiastic concept of participation, but it
is certainly not meant to simply replace it or to replicate
the basic principle just by coloring it black. Indeed, the re-
cent public and academic outcry against a decline of cul-
ture (Anderson, Yeo, Brossard, Scheufele, & Xenos, 2018;
Burkeman, 2017) is potentially as misguided as the naïve
enthusiastic embrace of citizen participation was.
I would argue that a future agenda for the research
on participation must accept and include both perspec-
tives, light and dark, and it needs to offer clearer bench-
marks on the societal relevance of both phenomena and
everything in between. Forms of participation, either
6 And indeed, I have to fully disclose that I also contributed to this discussion with more recent research on propaganda and populism, also in user
comments and participatory formats, and its impact on journalism. Anothermea culpamay be necessary at a later point of time.
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helpful or destructive, should not only be studied as de-
tached cases, extreme exceptions, or mere potential but
also as notable factors in the crucial information flow of
societies. This would require the development of integra-
tive theories on the conditions of participation that are
neither driven by wishful thinking nor doom and gloom.
Therefore, what we need in the debate is another stage
of development beyond simple black and white—amore
realistic and healthy debate that reflects human and so-
cial life in all its glorious shades of grey.
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